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This Article assesses the extent of inequality and marginalization in
the making of international law. It examines whether there is equal
contribution, and equal opportunity for contribution, in the making of
international law by and for all States. In particular, the Article ponders
whether the Global South is marginalized in law-making processes, or, put
another way, whether the Global North is privileged. The Article evaluates
whether there is equitable representation in international law-making
bodies, and it focuses on the two most prominent ones, namely the
International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission. The
assessment addresses both the formal requirements of representation and the
actual practices within both bodies.
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INTRODUCTION
International law is premised on the ideal of sovereign equality of States,1 or
at least it purports to be premised on that ideal.2 This applies equally to international
law-making. Thus, no State, not even the weakest and poorest, or the most
marginalized, can be bound by treaty obligations to which they have not consented. 3
Similarly, it is generally accepted that customary international law is established by
the general, widespread, and representative practices of States accepted as law.4
Yet, while sovereign equality is, in theory, a fundamental principle of
international law, it is well known that in reality there is no equality between
sovereigns. Much of the knowledge of sovereign inequality is intuitive and does not
require deep critical analysis. The inequality of the international system is there for
all to see. The most obvious (in your face) illustration of the inequality, the one that
receives the most attention, is the UN Security Council and the lack of
representation of African and Latin American States in the permanent membership
of the Council and the underrepresentation of developing States generally.5 It is not
only the underrepresentation of some States or the fact that the privileged States
have secured for themselves vetoes on the Council that undermines the notion of
sovereign equality and its pursuit. The arrogance and the added privileges that come
with the status of being a permanent member on the Council provide further
evidence of the illusion of sovereign equality. The arrogance of permanent members
of the UN Security Council is illustrated by the lack of humility these members

1. See, e.g., Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening), Judgment,
2012 I.C.J. 99, ¶ 57 (noting that immunity “derives from the principle of sovereign equality of States
which . . . is one of the fundamental principles of the international legal order.”); see also Hannah
Woolaver, Sovereign Equality as a Peremptory Norm of General International Law, in PEREMPTORY NORMS OF
GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW (JUS COGENS): DISQUISITIONS AND DISPUTATIONS (Dire Tladi ed.,
2021).
2. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 289 (7th ed. 2008) (“The
sovereignty and equality of States represents the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations,
which governs a community consisting primarily of States having a uniform legal personality.”).
3. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(providing that a “treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent,”
the so-called pacta tertiis rule).
4. See Int’l Law Comm’n., Draft Conclusions on the Identification of Customary International
Law, Conclusion 8, cmt. 3, U.N. Doc. A/73/10 (2018).
5. The well-known statistics are quite revealing: under the distribution of the Council as it
stands, 47% of the seats are allocated to fifty-two States (including Europe, the United States, New
Zealand, Australia, Canada and Israel), which account for around 17% of the world’s population. The
fifty-three States of the Asia-Pacific region, which account for nearly 60% of the world’s population,
are only allocated three seats (20%). The fifty-four States of the African group of States, account for
around 15% of the population, are also only allocated three seats. See Jean Francois Thibault, The UN
Security Council Isn’t Working: Will it Ever be Completely Reformed, CONVERSATION (June 21, 2020, 1:33
AM), https://theconversation.com/the-un-security-council-isnt-working-will-it-ever-be-completelyreformed-141109.
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demonstrate in claiming that the Council is not to be bound by the most basic,
fundamental rules of international law.6 This arrogance is also reflected in the
permanent members’ disdain of the processes designed to present a façade of equal
contribution of other States to the process of law-making on the Council.7 The
added privileges of permanent membership include control over important aspects
of the Secretariat’s functioning, such as the appointment of the Secretary-General
and the writing of the reports of the Secretary-General. For example, while under
the Charter, the Secretary-General is to be “appointed by the General Assembly
upon the recommendation of the Security Council,”8 in reality, the Council gives
the General Assembly a single name which it has to rubber-stamp, making a
mockery of the idea that it is the General Assembly that makes the appointment. 9
Similarly, while the Charter provides that the Secretary-General (and the rest of the
Secretariat), is to be independent of all governments, 10 there is at least anecdotal
evidence that permanent members have access to and are able to influence the
contents of the report of the Secretary-General in ways that would be unthinkable
for less powerful states.11 Permanent members also wield their power in the one
6. For example, China made the following comment in its statement before the Sixth
Committee:
Nonetheless, it was inappropriate to make an explicit reference to the relationship between
Security Council resolutions and jus cogens in the commentaries. The Council was the core of
the collective security mechanism of the United Nations. Its resolutions, whose authority
flowed from the Charter, must meet stringent procedural requirements and be in compliance
with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, as set out in the Charter. . . . His
delegation therefore suggested that references to Security Council resolutions be removed
from the commentaries to the draft conclusions.
U.N. GAOR, 74th Sess., 23d mtg. at ¶ 54, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/74/SR.23 (Oct. 28, 2019). Similarly, in its
written observations to the Commission, stated that “draft conclusion 16 and its commentary risk
undermining the authority of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the binding nature of
UNSC resolutions issued under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, noting that the “commentary states
expressly that draft conclusion 16 would apply to binding UNSC resolutions” and thus inviting “States,
irrespective of Article 103 of the UN Charter, to disregard or challenge binding UNSC resolutions by
relying on jus cogens claims.” Similar views were expressed by all the Permanent members.
7. For this statement, I present anecdotal evidence: During the negotiations of what became
UN Security Council Resolution 1989 on due process for the listing and delisting of suspected terrorists
or those associated with terrorist groups, the Russian delegate, which opposed the strengthening of due
process standards and knew that the overwhelming majority of the Council supported the strengthening
of due process, arrived at the informal consultations with a newspaper and would not utter a single
word. When, one day, as a delegate of South Africa, I asked him why he was not participating, he said
plainly, that these were not the negotiations, the real negotiations were taking place between the
Permanent members in the evenings after “you guys have left.”
8. See U.N. Charter art. 97.
9. See James O.C. Jonah, Secretariat: Independence and Reform, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON
THE UNITED NATIONS 160, 170–71 (Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws eds., 2007). Even the adoption
of General Assembly Resolution 69/231, which seeks to promote “transparency and inclusiveness,”
does not fundamentally alter the procedure. G.A. Res. 69/231, ¶ 34 (Sept. 11, 2015).
10. See U.N. Charter art. 100, ¶ 1 (“In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General
and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority
external to the Organization.”).
11. I beg indulgence to share an anecdote: In 2011, while serving as legal adviser of South Africa
to the United Nations, I was surprisingly invited to the farewell dinner of the UK legal adviser. In
attendance, apart from me, were the legal advisers of the permanent members of the Security Council
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organ of the United Nations touted for its egalitarianism, representativeness, and
democratic nature—the General Assembly—by exerting their international
relations power on smaller States.12
There are other ways that European heritage is privileged in law-making within
international law. The UN Legal Counsel, the top lawyer of the United Nations, is
at the level of the Under-Secretary-General and is appointed at the discretion of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. 13 It is probably not a well-known fact that
the position of legal adviser of the United Nations is as a practice reserved for a
European. Since the inception of the United Nations, eight people have held the
title of UN Legal Counsel, and all of them have come from Europe.14 Why? Because

and the Legal Adviser of the United Nations, at the time, Patricia O’Brien. At some point, in the course
of the conversation, they start reminiscing about how the Legal Adviser of the United Nations went
back and forth between the US legal adviser and the Russian legal adviser to get agreement on the text
of a Secretary-General’s Report on piracy off the coast of Somalia. The following year, in 2012, during
the annual interaction between UN International Law Commission and the Legal Adviser of the United
Nations, still Ms. O’Brien, I took the opportunity to ask her the question about the process for drafting
the reports of the Secretary-General. See U.N. ILCOR, 64th Sess., 3132d mtg. at ¶ 70, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/3132 (May 22, 2012) (“Mr. Tladi asked to what extent the Office of Legal Affairs, when
contributing to the reports on legal matters issued by the Secretary-General, felt the need to strike a
balance between providing high-quality information, on the one hand, and furnishing information that
was acceptable to Member States, on the other. For example, in the matter of piracy, the issue of
regional prosecution mechanisms—including specialized anti-piracy courts—had been covered in the
reports in some detail, while less coverage had been given to the question of natural resources, which
some States considered to be important”). As expected, Ms. O’Brien’s response insisted that there was
no undue influence. See id. at ¶ 75 (“Replying to Mr. Tladi’s question . . . . The Office had compiled its
reports with objectivity, professionalism and integrity and had duly submitted them to the Security
Council. On the basis of advice provided to it not only by her Office but also by national legal advisers,
the Council had decided that it would not be desirable to set up such a tribunal.”).
12. Here I offer, yet another, slightly more well-known anecdote from my time in the belly of
the beast. In 2012, a group of small island developing calling themselves Ambassadors for
Responsibility for Climate Change circulated a concept note and draft resolution (on file with author),
seeking to have the General Assembly request an advisory opinion from the International Court of
Justice on the “obligations and responsibilities under international law of a State for ensuring that
activities under its jurisdiction” do not contribute substantially to climate. It is now well-known that
while the resolution was widely supported by States, the group of States decided to withdraw it on the
eve of its adoption due to pressure from big States, in particular the United States, decided to withdraw
the application. Thus, through the sheer force and influence of economic muscle, some States exercise
a degree of control over law-making activities within the General Assembly. See generally Philippe Sands,
Climate Change and the Rule of Law: Adjudicating the Future in International Law, in THE PURSUIT OF A BRAVE
NEW WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN DUGARD 114 (Tiyanjana Maluwa, Max du Plessis & Dire
Tladi eds., 2017).
13. U.N. Joint Inspection Unit, Senior-Level Appointments in the United Nations, Its
Programmes and Funds, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. JIU/REP/2000/3 (2000) (“[A]ppointments to USG and ASG
positions . . . have traditionally been the personal responsibility of the Secretary-General. They fall
within the discretionary powers of the Secretary-General.”).
14. 1946–1952, Ivan Kerno (Czechoslovakia); 1953–1973, Constantin A. Stavropoulis (Greece);
1974–1982, Eric Suy (Belgium); 1983–1994, Carl-August Fleischhauer (Germany); 1994–2004, Hans
Axel Valdemar Corell (Sweden); 2004–2008, Nicolas Michel (Switzerland); 2008–2013, Patricia O’Brien
(Ireland); 2013–current, Miguel de Serpa Soares (Portugal).

64

UCI JRNL. OF INT’L, TRANSNATIONAL, & COMP. L.

[Vol. 7:60

no African, or Latin-American, or Asian can be trusted with directing the
international law affairs of the United Nations. 15
The theme of this conference, Colonialism, Capitalism, and Race in International
Law provides an opportunity to revisit questions of law-making, to ponder how
international law-making, and in particular the pursuit of equality in law-making, is
affected by colonialism, capitalism, and/or race. For the most part, legal scholarship
concerned with inequality, racism, and colonialism in international law has focused
on the content of the rules of international law and how these rules reflect
international law’s imperial and colonial past.16 The focus in much of the
scholarship is on deconstructing popular and hagiographic histories of international
law emerging from Europe.17 The actual practice of international law-making, and
the method of international law, has not featured so prominently in these
accounts.18
This Article addresses the question of inequality in international law-making
institutions—a question that has received very little attention in critical
scholarship.19 It does so by examining the International Law Commission
(hereinafter the “ILC” or “Commission”) and the International Court of Justice
(hereinafter the “ICJ” or “Court”), two marque institutions in international lawmaking. The work of these institutions in the context of inequality in law-making
has also received very little attention in the literature. In 2000, for example, Villanova
Law Review published a symposium on “Critical Race Theory and International
Law”.20 The articles in that volume cover a wide range of issues on race and
international law, but none address the role of the International Law Commission
and the International Court of Justice. Most recently, in 2021, UCLA Law Review
carried a symposium entitled “Transnational Legal Discourse on Race and

15. In an interview, former Legal Counsel of the United Nations, Hans Corell, described the
position as “one of the most interesting legal positions in the world, at the crossroads between law and
politics.” See International Centre for Ethics, Justice and Public Life, The Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral History
Project: An Interview with Hans Corell 17 (Brandeis, 2015).
16. See, e.g., Antony Anghie, “The Heart of My Home: Colonialism”: Environmental Damage and the
Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 445 (1993) (describing how colonialism was central to the project of
international law and how many of international law’s fundamental concepts emerged to perpetuate it);
James Thuo Gathii, Imperialism, Colonialism, and International Law, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1013 (2007); cf.
Emmanuelle Jouannet, Universalism and Imperialism: The True-False Paradox of International Law, 18 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 379 (2007).
17. See Antony Anghie, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 3 (2004); see also Anne Orford, The Past as Law or History? The Relevance of Imperialism for Modern
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NEW APPROACHES TO THE THIRD WORLD:
BETWEEN REPETITION AND RENEWAL (Mark Toufayan, Emmanuelle Tourme-Jouannet & Hélène
Ruiz Fabri eds., 2013).
18. But see MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES (1999).
19. For a rare example, see Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and
the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369 (2005), although this paper adopts an
historical approach, looking at different eras of hegemony—Spanish, British, and U.S. hegemony.
20. See Ruth Gordon, Foreword – Critical Race Theory and International Law: Convergence and Divergence,
45 VILLANOVA L. REV. 827 (2000).
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Empire”.21 As with the Villanova Law Review symposium twenty years earlier, none
of the UCLA Law Review symposium articles address the question of inequality in
law-making institutions and their practices. Yet the ILC and ICJ, individually and
collectively, exert more influence on the development of international law than
perhaps any other institution. It is thus important to consider how, if at all,
inequality in international law-making is reflected in their practice. There are many
ways that inequality and marginalization in these institutions could be studied. For
example, the study might consider the sources or materials relied upon by these
institutions and, in particular, the extent to which there is a proportional reliance on
sources and materials from different parts of the world. In this article, however, I
focus only on representation (i.e., who is represented in these bodies).
The Article begins in Part I by setting the scene of inequality and
marginalization in the context of the themes of the conference—colonialism,
capitalism, and race. Race is prominent and at the core of these themes and the next
Part, therefore, provides tentative observations of what race might mean in the
context of international law. Part II will provide a description of the role of the
International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission in lawmaking. This is followed in Part III by a discussion of representational inequality
and marginalization in the International Court of Justice and the International Law
Commission, including addressing why representation matters at all. Finally, I offer
some initial concluding thoughts.
A caveat is necessary. There are many other sources highlighting inequality
and marginalization in international law-making. A major factor for the
disproportionate influence of Europe in international law-making is education. Top
students all over the world have, for quite some time, sought to enhance their legal
education, including in international law, by studying abroad.22 Yet the flow is
disproportionately in one direction, from South to North. Latin-Americans, Asians,
and Africans—myself included—are rushing to undertake studies in the United
States, United Kingdom, France, and Switzerland, but Europeans and Americans
are not rushing to study in Africa, Asia, and Latin-America.23 Related to, but quite
apart, is the fact that a significantly disproportionate number of international
judges—and I would add members of the International Law Commission—hold
degrees from the United States and Europe.24 Another contributor to the
21. See E. Tendayi Achiume & Asli Bâli, Race and Empire: Legal Theory Within, Through, and Across
National Borders, 67 UCLA L. REV. 1386 (1989).
22. See BRYANT GARTH & GREGORY SHAFFER, The Globalization of Legal Education: A Critical
Perspective, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF LEGAL EDUCATION: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE (forthcoming
2021).
23. Anecdotally, I have come to know of people who, having obtained doctorate degrees at
South African universities, have decided to pursue the “lower” master’s degree in the United States, in
particular, at Harvard, ostensibly for the prestige conferred by a degree from this monument of U.S.
excellence.
24. According to Madsen, the top ten universities in education of international judges are, in
descending order: University of Cambridge (38), University of London (33), Harvard University (25),
University of Paris (24), University of Oxford (19), Columbia University (14), Yale University (11),
University of Madrid (10), University of Bonn (10) and New York University (10). See Mikael Rask
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disproportionate influence of some States in international law-making is what I have
elsewhere referred to as capacity constraints. 25 For example, while some States have
an “army of legal advisers for international law,” developing States have very few.26
In these circumstances, legal advisers having to choose between completing
mundane administrative tasks that are due and commenting on legally significant
international development, such as judicial decisions of the ICJ or the report of the
ILC, will choose the former.27
I. SETTING THE SCENE: RACE AND REPRESENTATION
The title of the symposium Colonialism, Capitalism, and Race in International Law
alludes to three themes, colonialism, capitalism, and race, and how these themes are
reflected in international law. Embedded in all three themes is “race.” It is thus
appropriate to say a few words about the concept of “race” in the context of
international law. Race, of course, isn’t real. It is an invention.28 We are all, after all,
human beings. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of
Racism has recalled that “today, race is appropriately understood as a social
construction . . . .”29 Yet this invention or social construction has historically been
used to subjugate and brutalize some people. Those that have been the victims of
the subjugation and oppression are those that this invention has classified as Blacks,
Asians, Latinos—anyone who was not white. For international law, the invention
of race has also meant that international law tends to reflect the interests of the

Madsen, Who Rules the World? The Educational Capital of the International Judiciary, in THE GLOBALIZATION
OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 22, fig.5.
25. See Dire Tladi, Reflections on Advising the South African Government on International Law, in THE
ROLE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER IN INT’L L. 170 (Andraž Zidar & Jean-Pierre Gauci eds. 2017).
26. Perhaps a final anecdote is warranted. In 2014, while giving lectures for the UN Regional
Course in International Law (Africa) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, I enquired from those that worked in
the Legal Advisers of Foreign Ministries, how many lawyers their Legal Advisers office had. I recall the
participant from Malawi said it was just he and the Legal Adviser. Only two lawyers servicing Malawi on
international law. This response caused to reflect about an experience I had had two years prior, while
South Africa was on the UN Security Council: In 2012 I facilitated a UN Security Council Presidential
Statement on the Rule (S/PRST/2012/1). One day, after a particularly long session in which the United
States had a truckload of proposals for amendments, I received a call from the U.S. delegate who, to
the best of my memory said, “Look Dire, I am really sorry to have to do this to you, but I have a few
more comments on the text. Unfortunately, I have fifteen lawyers studying these text from different
angles.” So, Malawi had two lawyers in total, the United States had fifteen lawyers working on one
Presidential Statement, not even a resolution!
27. Tladi, supra note 25.
28. See Ian Haney F. López, The Social Construction of Race, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995).
29. See Tendayi Achiume (Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism), Rep. of the
Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance:
Global Extractivism and Racial Inequality, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/41/54 (May 14, 2019). Thus, while the
notion of biological race is rejected, there is a recognition that construction of race is based on “physical
features and lineage” not because these are “a product of racial variation but because societies invest
them with social meaning.” Id. at ¶ 13; see also Aníbal Quijano, Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism in Latin
America, 15(2) INT’L SOCIO. 215, 216–217 (2000).
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dominator while marginalizing the subjugated, leading to calls for the
“unwhitening” of international law.30
Yet, in the context of international law, race cannot simply mean the color of
one’s skin. As Makau Mutua observes, in the context of international law, race in
the narrow sense of color has “no immediate utility to a global population . . . three
quarters of whom live in the developing or so-called ‘Third World.’”31 In this sense,
the approach to race in this chapter is directed at “persisting structures of global
racial inequality” which affect “formerly colonized nations and peoples subordinate
to the interests of powerful nations.”32 Thus, for the purposes of this paper, race
(when it is used) is understood in the context of geopolitics, with those regarded as
the excluded and marginalized race coming from the peripheral, formerly colonized
territories of the world commonly known as the South or the Third World, and with
the privileged race being those from territories of the descendants of Europe, or the
North.33 In UN language, the privileged would be those from the so-called Western
Europe and Other Group (Western Europe, the United States, Canada, New
Zealand, Australia and Israel),34 and the Eastern European Group. The South is
composed of the territories of the Africa Group, the Group of Latin American and
the Caribbean States, and the Group of Asian and Pacific States, and the inhabitants
of those territories. For Mutua, the North is “the global white racial hierarchy” and
the marginalized group from the South is “Africa in particular and the Third World
in general.”35 This sentiment is also expressed by Gordon who states that “southern,
developing Third World is for the most part the colored world and . . . it is
marginalized, disproportionately poor and relatively powerless.” 36
This geopolitical approach to race, of course, raises a question of nuance that
cannot be addressed in an article whose focus is on law-making institutions. This
approach may be critiqued as an oversimplification—and it probably is—for it
equates (or seems to equate) race with nationality. We might, in this context, ask
where we are to place members of the diaspora who find themselves in the
territories of the privileged? Where are we to place Europeans (or descendants from
Europe) who find themselves in the territories of marginalized?37 The issue that this
question evokes is probably central in the dividing line between TWAIL scholarship
and Critical Race Theory scholarship, with the former focused more on the
30. See Christopher Gevers, “Unwhitening the World”: Rethinking Race and International Law, 67
UCLA L. REV. 1652 (2021).
31. Makau Mutua, Keynote Address – Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an InsiderOutsider, 45 VILLANOVA L. REV. 841, 843.
32. See Achiume Report, supra note 29, ¶ 14. See also E. Tendayi Achiume & Devon W. Carbado,
Critical Race Theory Meets Third World Approaches to Int’l L., 67 UCLA L. REV. 1462, 1466 (2021).
33. Upendra Baxi, Some Newly Emergent Geographies of Injustice: Boundaries and Borders in Int’l L., 23
IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 15 (2016).
34. While this is meant to be a regional group, you will notice that there is nothing geographical
about this group. When my students ask me what do these States have in common, I always say “rich,
white countries.”
35. Mutua, supra note 31, at 847.
36. Gordon, supra note 20, at 831.
37. See id. at 834 (positing similar questions).
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geopolitical and the latter on race in a narrow sense.38 Concerning the critique of
oversimplification and of equating race with nationality, however, it should be
recalled that race is a social construct, ascribed to people and not inherent in them.
As such, it will mean different things in different contexts. In international law, race
should be seen from a geopolitical perspective. But equally important, because it is a social
construct without scientific and objective meaning, it is perfectly acceptable to
assign a sliding scale to questions of race, so that, at least in the context of
international law, one may be less or more marginalized and more or less privileged.
By this I mean that there are varying degrees of marginalization, 39 and this article
seeks to account generally for marginalization. Thus, while accepting the possibility
of imprecision, this paper focuses on geopolitical marginalization as the prism
through which to account for race in international law-making.
I should also pause to say that, while this conference concerns colonialism and
race, and, as a result, the article is concerned with a particular basis for
marginalization and inequality in law-making, it is safe to assume that the same
conclusions would be reached if the questions were posed from a gender
perspective. At the risk of prejudging the discussion in Section 3, the basic statistics
bear this out. The first women elected to the International Law Commission, Paula
Escarameia and Hanqin Xue, were elected only in 2000, an incredible 51 years after
the Commission came into existence. In its seventy-three-year history,40 only seven
women have ever served on the Commission. 41 The same is gender imbalance plays
out in respect of the International Court of Justice.42
II. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION IN LAW-MAKING
A. The International Court of Justice
The International Court of Justice is the preeminent judicial organ of
international law. Even though, as a doctrinal matter, international law operates as
a horizontal, non-hierarchical system, with all courts having equal status, there is no

38. See Achiume & Carbado, supra note 32, at 1464 (describing the divide, the authors make the
following observations: “One might, for example, reasonably ask the colonization question vis-à-vis
CRT (why are problems of empire, imperialism, and colonization largely absent from CRT?). In a similar
vein, one might reasonably ask the racialization question vis-à-vis TWAIL (why are problems of
racialization . . . not more central part of TWAIL?)”). See also Gordon, supra note 20, at 830
(“International legal theory rarely mentions race, much less employs it as a basis of analysis.
Internationalists frame hierarchy in terms of economic strength, military power or technological
advancement. Terms such as north/south, developed/developing or ‘Third World,’ are the preferred
terms of reference.”).
39. The idea of differentiation, sliding scale, hierarchy in recognition (and non-recognition), is
nothing new. See Martii Koskenniemi, Race, Hierarchy and International Law: Lorimer’s Legal Science, 27 EUR.
J. OF INT’L L. 415, 417, 427 (2016).
40. This figure is likely to change in 2023.
41. As of 2021, the women that have served on the Commission are Paula Escarameia, Hanqin
Xue, Marie Jacobsson, Concepción Escobar Hernandez, Patrícia Galvão Teles, Marja Lehto, and
Nilufer Oral.
42. As of 2021, the ICJ had had 109 judges in its seventy-five-year history.
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question that the ICJ is regarded is the most important court. 43 Rosenne has, for
example, asserted notwithstanding this horizontal nature of international law, and
the lack of hierarchy of courts in international law, “other international courts
generally follow the ICJ’s reasoning . . . . An international court or tribunal that fails
to heed the ICJ’s decisions would rapidly lose the confidence of its clientele.”44
Disproportionate influence over the Court—referred to by some as the World
Court—will also mean a disproportionate influence on the development of
international law.
The claim that influence over the Court implies an influence over the
development of international law may be refuted on the basis that the Court’s role
is to resolve disputes between States, and not to develop the law. It might certainly
be pointed out that the Statute of the Court itself states that the “decisions of the
Court [have] no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that
particular case.”45 Yet, it is undeniable that the Court has been the primary driver
behind many rules of international law,46 and is often cited as an authority for
various propositions in international law, despite its rules clearly providing that its
decisions only bind the states party to the dispute. The role of the Court in the
development of international law has varied from laying the seeds for new rules of
international law to refining the content and scope of existing rules. Perhaps even
more significantly, the methodological rules on how substantive rules of
international law must be identified have developed mainly on the basis of the
jurisprudence of the Court.
The significant influence that the Court has exerted over international law can
be illustrated in several areas.47 I refer to three examples in particular. The first
example is the doctrine of erga omnes obligations.48 As is well-known, under the
general rules of international law, the responsibility of a State can only be invoked
43. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System
and the International Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. OF INT’L L. & POL’Y 791, 798 (1999) (describing the I.C.J.
has having a “a central role”); Leo Park, The International Court and Rule-Making: Finding Effectiveness, 39
UNIV. PA. J. INT’L L. 1965, 1074 (2018).
44. SHABTAI ROSENNE, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. ¶ 20 (2006).
45. See Art. 59 of Statute of the I.C.J. In this respect, Art. 38(1)(d) provides that decisions of
courts serve as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international law. While Art. 38(1)(d)
does not specify that this refers to the I.C.J., it is understood that pre-eminent authority relied on under
Art. 38(1)(d) of the Statute is the I.C.J. See Int’l L. Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Seventieth Session,
U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at Conclusion 13 (“Decisions of international courts and tribunals, in particular
of the International Court of Justice, concerning the existence and content of rules of customary
international law are a subsidiary means for the determination of such rules.”).
46. See generally Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, President of the Ct., Speech of the President of the Court
Abdulqawi Yusuf before the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly: “The UN at 75: International
Law and the Future We Want” (Oct. 26, 2020) (describing the role of the Court in the development of
international law).
47. The section of the article is adapted from a forthcoming chapter Dire Tladi, “The Role of
the International Court of Justice in the Development of International Law.”
48. See generally Martha M. Bradley, Jus Cogens’ Preferred Sister: Obligations Erga Omnes and the
International Court of Justice – Fifty Years after the Barcelona Traction Case, in PEREMPTORY NORMS OF
GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW (JUS COGENS): DISQUISITIONS AND DISPUTATIONS (Dire Tladi ed.,
2021) (discussing the ICJ’s role in the entrenchment of the doctrine of erga omnes).
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by a State whose rights are breached by the responsible State. 49 An illustration of
this principle is the 1966 judgement of the Court where it found that neither
Ethiopia nor Liberia had “established any legal right or interest appertaining to them
in the subject-matter of the” claim against South Africa in respect of the latter’s
application of its Apartheid policies in Namibia,50 essentially reversing its decision
in the preliminary phase of the proceedings, where it had held that Liberia and
Ethiopia had standing. 51 While this decision has been criticized from a normative
perspective,52 it was probably justifiable from a purely positivist perspective relying
on the general rule that the responsibility of a State can only be invoked by a State
whose rights are breached by the responsible State.53 Yet, in Barcelona Traction, the
Court came up with the famous distinction between obligations inter partes and
obligations erga omnes.54 While the Court’s conclusion is (normatively) justifiable, the
Court offers not a single evidence of practice to support the distinction it puts
forward. This distinction, which when put forward by the Court, was not based on
any identified evidence of State practice, is now generally accepted, unquestionably,
as part of international law.55 It was simply an invention—a welcome invention, but
an invention nonetheless—by the Court of a concept which has since come to be
unquestioned in law.

49. Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938 P.C.I.J., (ser. A/B) No. 74, 10, at 28 (“This act
being attributable to the State and described as contrary to the treaty right of another State, international
responsibility would be established immediately as between the two States.”); see also Reparation for
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, at 181–82
(“The first is that the defendant State has broken an obligation towards the national State in respect of
its nationals. The second is that only the party to whom an international obligation is due can bring a claim in respect
of its breach” (emphasis added)).
50. South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6, at 51.
51. South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J., 319, at 319.
52. See Leo Gross, Conclusions, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
747 (Leo Gross ed., 1976); see also John Dugard and Rosalind Elphick, International Adjudication, in
DUGARD’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 683-84 (John Dugard, Max du
Plessis, Tiya Maluwa and Dire Tladi eds., 2018); see generally Jean Allain, Decolonisation as the Source of
Concepts of Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes, 2016 ETH. Y.B. OF INT’L. L. 35; see also Dire Tladi, The
International Court of Justice and South Africa, in Achilles Schodas, HANDBOOK ON THE INT’L. CT. OF JUST.
(forthcoming 2020).
53. See, e.g., Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938 P.C.I.J., (ser. A/B) No. 74, 10, at 28
(explaining that an internationally wrongful act establishes a relationship of responsibility “between the
States”); see ¶ 1 of the Comm. to Art. 42 of the 2001 Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, Rep. of the Int’l Law Commission on Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10 (2001) (“Article 42 provides that the implementation of the State responsibility is in the first
place an entitlement of the ‘injured State.’” (emphasis added)).
54. Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited: New
Application, Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, at ¶ 33–35 (July 24).
55. See, e.g., Art. 48(1)(b) of the Article on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
2001 Y.B. OF THE INT’L. L. COMM’N. 128; Draft Conclusion of the Draft Conclusions on Peremptory
Norms, supra note 16; see generally Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago
from Mauritius in 1965, Judgment, 2019 I.C.J. (Feb. 25); see generally CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT &JEANMARC THOUVENIN, THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: JUS
COGENS AND OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES (Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds.,
2006).
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A second notable example concerns the scope of immunity ratione personae
under international law. In the Arrest Warrant case, the International Court of Justice
had to answer two interrelated questions concerning immunity ratione personae.56
First, the Court had to determine whether Ministers for Foreign Affair were entitled
to immunity ratione personae, and second, if so, whether there are exceptions to this
type of immunity for serious crimes such as crimes against humanity and genocide.
The Court answered the first question in the affirmative (i.e., Ministers for Foreign
Affairs were entitled to immunity ratione personae, while determining that there were
no exceptions to this rule). Yet, as was the case with the introduction of erga omnes
obligation in Barcelona Traction, the Court did not provide any practice in support of
the conclusion that Ministers for Foreign Affairs are entitled to immunity ratione
personae,57 relying instead on deductions based on the functions of the Foreign
Minister and comparisons with the Heads of State.58 The Arrest Warrant case has
been significant for the development of international law on immunities. The rules
set forth in the Arrest Warrant case have been the starting point for any discussion
on the scope of immunity ratione personae.59
While Barcelona Traction and Arrest Warrant are examples of judgments of the
Court which, without the requisite State practice, have contributed to the
development of international law in new areas, the jurisprudence of the Court on
the use of force against non-State actors has influenced the development of law in
a slightly different way. In the Military and Paramilitary Activities case, the Court held
that the right to use force in response to an attack from non-State actors is
permissible only if the non-State actors in question were sent by or acting on behalf
of a State ( i.e., the State in whose territory the self-defense measures are to be taken
must have exercised effective control over the non-State actors in question).60 This

56. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.),
Judgment, 2000 I.C.J. Rep. (Oct. 17).
57. For its conclusion that there were no exceptions to immunity ratione personae, the Court did
engage in a rather detailed analysis of State practice and opinio juris. Id. at ¶ 58.
58. Id. at ¶ 53 (“In order to determine the extent of these immunities, the Court must therefore
first consider the nature of the functions exercised by a Minister for Foreign Affairs. He or she is in
charge of his or her Government’s diplomatic activities and generally acts as its representative in
international negotiations and intergovernmental meetings. Ambassadors and other diplomatic agents
carry out their duties under his or her authority. His or her acts may bind the State represented, and
there is a presumption that a Minister for Foreign Affairs, simply by virtue of that office, has full powers
to act on behalf of the State. . . .”).
59. See generally KOBINA DANIEL, HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY UNDER THE MALABO
PROTOCOL: TRIUMPH OF IMPUNITY OVER ACCOUNTABILITY? (2021).
60. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27) (“There appears now to be general agreement on the nature of the acts
which can be treated as constituting armed attacks. In particular, it may be considered to be agreed that
an armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces across an
international border, but also “the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount
to” [inter alia] an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, “or its substantial involvement
therein.”).
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view has been confirmed by the Court in subsequent decisions. 61 Unlike Barcelona
Traction and Arrest Warrant, this jurisprudence was based on State practice in the
form of treaty practice and resolutions of General Assembly.62 Furthermore, unlike
the examples in Barcelona Traction and Arrest Warrant, the Court’s jurisprudence
concerning the use of force in self-defense against non-State has, at least in recent
times, being questioned in some quarters.63 The impact of the Court’s jurisprudence
on the development of international law has, therefore, not been in the form of
putting forward a rule which was subsequently followed and solidified into a rule of
customary international law. Rather, the Court’s jurisprudence has been used to
ward off attempts to amend (some would say undermine) the existing rule and put
in place a system that makes the use of force more permissive.64
B. The International Law Commission
The International Law Commission is a subsidiary organ of the General
Assembly and aids the General Assembly in its mandate for the codification and
progressive development of international law. 65 The Commission too has played
(and continues to play) an influential role in the development of international law. 66
Its role is undoubtedly not nearly as pronounced as that of its more prestigious sister
institution, the Court, but it would be a mistake to underestimate the role played by
the Commission in shaping international law.67 Indeed because of the significant
role that the International Law Commission plays in the development of
international law, a new debate has arisen over the role of the Commission as a
creator of “new law.”68
61. Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 51 (Nov. 6); Case
Concerning the Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo. v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 146 (Dec. 19); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9).
62. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J., ¶¶ 195–96.
63. For an accessible account of the debate, see MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, CHRISTIAN TAMS
& DIRE TLADI, MAX PLANCK TRIALOGUES ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (VOLUME 1): SELFDEFENCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS (2019).
64. Dire Tladi, The Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors, 418 RECUEIL DES COURS
DE L’ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INT’L DE LA HAYE 237 (2021).
65. See Statute of the International Law Commission, art. 1 (“The International Law
Commission shall have for its object the promotion of the progressive development of international
law and its codification.”).
66. See generally Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, The International Law Commission in Mirror –
Forms, Impact and Authority, in SEVENTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION:
DRAWING A BALANCE FOR THE FUTURE (U.N. ed., Brill 2021) (stating that the Commission work has
“transposed many rules of customary international law into easily accessible pronouncements . . . [and
has] resulted in the establishment of many new rules”).
67. See Alejandro Rodiles, The International Law Commission and Change: Not Tracing It but Facing It
in SEVENTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION at 116–18 (noting that what is
sometimes perceived as its waning importance is in fact a reflection of its “resilience”).
68. See Yifeng Chen, Between Codification and Legislation: A Role for the International Law Commission
as an Autonomous Law-Maker, in SEVENTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION; see also
Ineta Ziemela, The Functions of the International Law: Identifying Existing Law or Proposing New Law?, in
SEVENTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION; see also Sean D. Murphy, Immunity
Ratione Materiae of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction: Where is the State Practice in Support of
Exceptions?, in 112 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 4 (2018); see, e.g., Dire Tladi, Codification, Progressive
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Very often, the contribution of the International Law Commission is reduced
to its historical contribution in producing texts that States then adopt (after some
adaptation) as treaties. Its contribution to areas such as the law of the sea, 69 the
codification of the law of treaties,70 and immunities71 are of course well-known. 72
Its contribution to the adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court
is well-known.73 But it is not only in treaty-making that the Commission’s influence
can be felt. The Commission’s effect on the development of international law is just
as significant in connection in relation to customary international law and
approaches to international law.
There are several examples of the impact of the Commission’s work on
international law and the fundamental principles of international law, beyond the
classical treaty adopted on the basis of its work. In the interest of time and space, I
will provide only three examples. The first example is the role of the Commission
in setting out the basic principles of what has become the field of international
criminal law. The second example is the Commission’s role in the secondary rules
of international law on State responsibility. Finally, the third example that will be
addressed in this section in the notion of peremptory norms of general international
law (jus cogens) in international law.
As noted above, the Commission’s contribution to the Statute of the ICC is
well-known. But in fact, the Commission’s influence on international criminal law
has been broader than just the adoption of the Rome Statute. The very principles
Development, New Law, Doctrine, and the Work of the International Law on Peremptory Norms of General
International Law (Jus Cogens): Personal Reflection of the Special Rapporteur, 13 FLA. INT’L UNIV. L. REV. 1137,
1138 (2019).
69. See, e.g., 1956 Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea, 1956 Y.B. INT.’L L. COMM’N. U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1. The treaties adopted on the basis of this set of articles are: 1958
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; 1958 Convention on the High Seas; 1958
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas; 1958 Convention
on the Continental Shelf; and the 1958 Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes.
70. 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, 1966 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N., U.N. Sales No. 67.V.2.
Vol II (forming the basis of which 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was adopted); see
also 1982 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between International
Organisations, 1982 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.1(Part 2) (forming
the basis of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
71. See 1958 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, 1958 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N.,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1958/Add.1 (forming the basis of several treaties: 1961 Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961 Optional Protocol Concerning Acquisition of Nationality,
and the 1961 Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes).
72. For a comprehensive list of treaties adopted on the basis of the work of the Commission,
see Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, International Law Commission (ILC), MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INT’L L. (Mar. 2017) (select bibliograph, multilateral conventions concluded under the auspices
of the United Nations following the consideration of the topics by the International Law Commission).
73. The 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was negotiated by States on the
basis of two instruments of the International Law Commission. See 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against
Peace and Security of Mankind, 1966 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N., A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1; Draft Statute
of the International Criminal Court, 1994 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n., U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1(Part 2). For a discussion of the history, see Dire Tladi, International
Criminal Court, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. (2020).
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that are now regarded as the core of international criminal law were first enunciated
in an instrument of general application in the Commission’s Nuremberg
Principles.74 These include the fundamental principle of individual criminal
responsibility for commission of offences of international law,75 and the principle
that the official capacity does not constitute a ground for exclusion of criminal
responsibility.76 Indeed the crimes that today are considered crimes under
international law can be traced back to the ILC’s principles.77 These principles,
which were ultimately reiterated in the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes, 78 were
developed further after 1950 in the first Draft Code of 1954.79 It was really through
the Commission’s work that these principles which, without the legitimating effect
of the Commission, would be seen as an application of victor’s justice, came to be
seen as principles of international law applicable beyond the context of a particular
conflict. These principles today form the foundation of an area of international law
concerned with individual criminal responsibility—international criminal law.
The ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility80 are perhaps the ILC’s most
influential output—second perhaps only to the ILC’s draft articles on the law of
treaties.81 This instrument, a culmination of nearly four decades’ work by the
Commission, has been one of the most important outcomes of the Commission,
notwithstanding (or perhaps because of) the fact that it was not eventually approved
by States as a treaty.82 This set of articles, or at least a large part of it, is generally
regarded as an expression of customary international law.83 Unlike the ILC’s work
on international criminal law, the Articles on State Responsibility do not apply to
only a particular area of international law, but broadly to all areas of international
law.

74. 1950 Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and in the
Judgment of the Tribunal, 1950 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N,, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1 (1957).
75. Id. at 195.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind, supra note 73.
79. 1954 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1954 Y.B. INT’L COMM’N.,
U.N. Doc. A/Cn.4/SER.A/1954/Add.1.
80. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1(Part 2).
81. Pavel Šturma, The Responsibility of States: State of Play and the Way Forward, ANNUÁRIO DE
DEREITO INTERNACIONAL 95, 95 (2013) (“Let me start by expressing my view that the Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts are of the major achievements in the
codification and progressive development of international law. They can be considered together with
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as the most important results of the work of the
International Law Commission.”).
82. See, e.g., Patrícia Galvão Teles, The Impact and Influence of the Articles on State Responsibility on the
Work of the International Law Commission and Beyond, EJIL:TALK! (Aug. 3, 2021),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-impact-and-influence-of-the-articles-on-state-responsibility-on-thework-of-the-international-law-commission-and-beyond/; see also Dire Tladi, The Fate of the Draft Articles
on State Responsibility: Act Soon or Face the Further Erosion of the Role of States in the International Law-Making
Process, ANNUÁRIO DE DEREITO INTERNACIONAL 87 (2013).
83. For discussion, see David D. Caron, The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical
Relationship Between Form and Authority, 96 AM. J. INT’L. L. 857 (2002).
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The third example of the ILC’s immense influence concerns the place of jus
cogens in modern international law. Through its work on the law of treaties, the
International Law Commission, almost singlehandedly, took jus cogens, a concept that
at the time was at the periphery of international law, championed by scholars but
with no pedigree in the practice of States, and placed it smack bang in the center of
international law.84 I must stress that this was not simply a transposition of a rule
without pedigree! This particular rule—that there existed, in international law, rules
that were superior to international law, so much so that they could invalidate other
rules—was so contrary to the fundamental logic of international law as an horizontal
system that it was nothing short of a revolution.85 Yet, largely because the ILC said
so, jus cogens is now firmly part of modern international law. Moreover, even beyond
the treaty rule contained in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, it has been through
the Commission that other aspects of the doctrine of jus cogens have been developed.
For example, the Articles on State Responsibility referred to above identified
particular consequences of jus cogens beyond treaty law (e.g., the rule that grounds
excluding wrongfulness cannot be relied upon in respect of jus cogens norms),86 and
the duty not to recognize or assist in the maintenance of situations caused by a
serious breach of jus cogens.87 The norms generally recognized as having jus cogens
character are those that the ILC has decreed to have such status in its works on the
law of treaties,88 State responsibility,89 and fragmentation.90
C. The ILC and the ICJ: Formidable Individually, Untouchable United
The International Law Commission and the International Court of Justice
both exert an incredible amount of influence on the development of international
law. Moreover, very often, though certainly not always, these two powerful
institutions act together in concert and when they do, the result is an irresistible
influence on international law. While the ILC has, as part of its agenda, interactions
with other bodies, it is clear that its interactions with the International Court of
Justice, represented by the President of the Court, are most important.91 The strong
84. The full extent to which the Commission’s introduction of the concept of jus cogens into the
mainstream of international law was “awe-inspiring” and “nothing short of a miracle” is considered in
a forthcoming manuscript. Dire Tladi, Grotian Moments and Peremptory Norms of General International Law:
Friendly Facilitators or Fatal Foes?, 42 GROTIANA (forthcoming 2021).
85. Dire Tladi, The ILC’s Draft Conclusions on Peremptory Norms of General International Law: Personal
Reflections of the Special Rapporteur, 24 AUSTRIAN REV. OF INT’L & EUR. L. 121, 126 (2019).
86. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 82, at art. 26.
87. Id. at art. 41.
88. See Commentary to art. 50 of the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, supra note 70, at ¶
4.
89. See Commentary to art. 26 of the Articles on States Responsibility, supra note 53, at ¶5.
90. See Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International
Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Int’l Law
Comm’n Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session, at ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006).
91. When, due to time pressures, the Commission decided to reduce the amount of time spent
with each body to half a morning, it retained the full morning interaction with the President of the
Court. Moreover when, due to the time pressures resulting from Covid-related changes in working
methods in 2021, it decided not to have any interactions with external bodies, the President of the ICJ
was still invited to interact with the Commission.

76

UCI JRNL. OF INT’L, TRANSNATIONAL, & COMP. L.

[Vol. 7:60

bond between these two bodies, which has been described as a “special
relationship,” 92 is forged in part because the two bodies, while performing different
functions, are the main organs for international law in the UN system. The late
Judge James Crawford, who had served on both bodies, was reported by the current
President of the ICJ to have described the relationship between the organs as a
“‘symbiotic’ yet ‘dialectical’ relationship that had developed . . . irrespective of the
completely different tasks of the two bodies.”93
This “special relationship” is reflected in a variety of ways. It is not lost on
many observers that many members of the Court, prior to their elevation to the
Court, had been members of the Commission. At the time of writing, about a third
of the fifteen members of the Court had previously been members of the
International Law Commission (exactly a third if we include the late James Crawford
who had just passed on at the time of writing). 94 Second, and perhaps most
important, is the extent to which each body relies on the work. Notwithstanding the
accepted wisdom that views the Court’s jurisprudence as “subsidiary,” the
jurisprudence of the Court is at the heart of the most important positions adopted
by the Commission, ranging from the fundamental rules on the identification of
customary international law,95 the conclusion that the rule in Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention is customary international law,96 and the fundamental rule that
the breach of an international obligation by a State entails its responsibility, 97 to
name but a few.98 The International Law Commission’s work on the Immunity of
Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction has, at least in respect to immunity
ratione personae, been based on the Arrest Warrant case findings concerning persons
covered by immunity ratione personae and the rules on exceptions. 99 The ICJ itself
92. Omri Sender, THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP:
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, AND THEIR
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge, forthcoming).

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE,
UNEXPECTED PARTNERSHIP IN SHAPING

93. See Judge Joan Donoghue, ILC Summary Records, 72d Sess., 3548th mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SR.3548 (July 22, 2021).
94. In addition to Crawford, Judges Nolte (Germany), Gevorgian (Russia), Tomka (Slovakia),
and Xue (China), had all been members of the Commission.
95. See Conclusions on the Identification of Customary International Law, supra note 4, at 17–
22.
96. See id. at 17.
97. See, e.g., Commentary to art. 1 of the Articles on the Responsibility of States supra note 53,
at ¶ 2 (referring to many ICJ and its predecessor the Permanent Court of International Justice judgments
in support of the rule).
98. For a discussion, see Dire Tladi (Special Rapporteur), Fourth Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens), U.N. Doc A/CN.4/727 (Jan. 31, 2019).
99. On persons covered, see Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Fourth Session,
U.N. Doc. A/72/10, 175 (2017) (“Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign
Affairs enjoy immunity ratione personae from the exercise of foreign criminal jurisdiction.”); on
exceptions, see Draft Article 7, which, while permitting exceptions to immunity ratione materiae, does
not do the same for immunity ratione personae (“As Draft Article 7 refers solely to immunity from
jurisdiction ratione materiae, it is included in Part Three of the draft articles and does not apply in respect
of immunity from jurisdiction ratione personae. . . . .”); see also Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development and Others v. Southern African Litigation Centre and Others (4) BCLR 487 (SCA) (Mar.
3,
2016),
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/caseLaw.xsp?
documentId=06B21F9772B4BB00C1257FB1002E7060&action=openDocument&xp_countrySelecte
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routinely cites to the work of the ILC in support of its findings.100 Indeed the Court
even often refers to uncompleted work of the International Law Commission. 101
Sometime ago, I described the relationship between the Commission and the Court
in terms of law-making in the following terms:
The problem is that reverence with which the [ILC’s Articles on State
Responsibility] is held has had the effect of excluding the State, the
principal law-maker, from the law-making process . . . The law-making
process concerning State responsibility can be crudely described as follows:
the Commission speaks through the Articles, the Court and academics
endorse the work of the Commission and then voila, you have rules of
customary international law.102
III. REPRESENTATIONAL INEQUALITY AND MARGINALISATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING
A. The International Court of Justice
The Statute of the International Court of Justice addresses representation,
directly and explicitly. It provides that the Court “shall be composed of a body of
independent judges, elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high
moral character.”103 At the same, the Statute provides that at each election “the
electors shall bear in mind . . . that in the body as a whole the representation of the
main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world should be
assured.”104
A preliminary point to make in assessing the Statute is whether the phrases
“the main forms of civilization” and “the principal legal systems” are sufficient to
require the representation of the traditionally excluded and marginalized peoples.
Whether representation is required will be dependent on interpretation. A dynamic
interpretation of these concepts would promote the representation of nationals
from the South. The second point to make is that whatever the scope of those
concepts, the Statute does not require the representation “of the main forms of
d=ZA&xp_topicSelected=GVAL-992BU6&from=state (causing the South African Supreme Court of
Appeal to rely heavily on the Arrest Warrant case conclusion that there were, under customary
international law, no exceptions to the rules on immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction).
100. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 3, at ¶ 136 (Feb. 3).
101. The Articles on State Responsibility provide an interesting illustration of the mutual
citation by the two bodies. In 1997, the International Court of Justice relied on the Draft Articles of
the ILC provisionally adopted in 1980 for its statement that it “is well established that, when a State has
committed an internationally wrongful act, its international responsibility is likely to be involved
whatever the nature of the obligation . . . .” See Case Concerning Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.
v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, at ¶ 47 (Sept. 25). Four years later, the Commission relied on
the 1997 judgment when it adopted on final reading, Articles on State Responsibility. See Commentary
to Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States art. 1, supra note 53, at ¶ 2.
102. Dire Tladi, The Fate of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility: Act Soon or Face the Further
Erosion of the Role of States in the International Law-Making Process, ANNUARIO DE DEREITO INT’L 87, 91
(2015).
103. U.N. Charter & Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 2 (emphasis added).
104. Id. at art. 9 (emphasis added).
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civilization” or for that matter “of the principal legal systems of the world.” To the
contrary, the Statute itself states that the composition shall be determined
“regardless of [the] nationality [of its members].” In other words, there is no
requirement for nationals of States from the South to be represented. An ICJ
composed of fifteen members from the North, if duly elected in accordance with
the procedures of the electoral bodies (the General Assembly and the Security
Council), would thus be fully consistent with the Statute. Thus, the Statute itself
appears to be neutral toward representation. While the Statute is neutral toward
representation, in practice, certain nationalities are underrepresented in the ICJ.
Elections to the Court reveal that States do take seriously the call in Article 9
to “take into account” the need for representation. In practice—with the exception
of a recent election—States respect an informal agreement to reserve a set of
number of seats for different regions, thus ensuring some spread and representatives.
Yet, questions can be asked about whether this representation is sufficiently fair and
equitable. To make a rough comparison, under this general understanding, WEOG
(that group of States that I routinely describe to my students as the group of “white
rich States”), a significantly smaller group, whether in terms of number of States or
populations,105 is “entitled” to a third of the seats (five seats),106 while Africa, which
has nearly double the number of States and larger population, is entitled only a fifth
(three seats). Similarly, the Group of Asia and the Pacific which also accounts for
nearly double the number of States of WEOG and nearly sixty percent of the
population of UN members, is entitled to only two seats.107 These are truly
remarkable statistics, but they should come as no surprise. A close inspection of this
informal arrangement reveals that the “desired” composition of the Court reflects
the composition of the UN Security Council—a body whose lack of
representativeness is well documented.
It is true that a large part of the reasons for the skewed representational
arrangement of the ICJ is the voting system, which requires a majority in both the
General Assembly and the Security Council,108 thus giving the same States that are
overrepresented in the Security Council a greater say in the composition of the
Court. The main reason for the skewed representation under the informal
arrangement, however, is the expectation that some States must be represented in
the Court. The result of this expectation is that even those States that are
disadvantaged by the informal arrangement continue to vote in accordance with the
105. See supra note 5.
106. At the time of writing, WEOG only has three seats but this is because of the death of
James Cameron, whose seat had yet to be filled, and the exceptional break from the tradition, when the
Lebanese Judge Nawaf Salam defeated the British, then sitting Judge, Christopher Greenwood. Dapo
Akande, ICJ Elections 2017: UN General Assembly and Security Council Elect Four Judges to the ICJ but Fail to
Agree on a Fifth, Yet Again! + Trivia Question, EJIL: TALK! (Nov.11, 2017), https://
www.ejiltalk.org/icj-elections-2017-un-general-assembly-and-security-council-elect-four-judges-tothe-icj-but-fail-to-agree-on-a-fifth-yet-again-trivia-question/.
107. At the time of writing Asia has three seats on account of the rather extraordinary election
victory of Judge Salam over Judge Greenwood. Id. at 2.
108. See U.N. Charter & Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 4.
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skewed representational framework. This sense almost of inevitability is wellcaptured in the reporting by Dapo Akande in the midst of the anomalous elections
that resulted in Asia and the Pacific securing a third seat “at the expense of WEOG”:
What is perhaps most remarkable about this election, at least thus far,
is that Judge Christopher Greenwood, the judge of British nationality, was
not re-elected in the first “meeting.” The two remaining judge candidates
for re-election, who must now fight out on Monday are Judge Greenwood
and Judge Bhandari (India), both sitting judges on the Court. Were Judge
Greenwood not to be re-elected on Monday this would be a very significant
break from the past . . . . It would be the first time that there would be no British
judge on the ICJ . . . . It would break the tradition of there being a judge of
the nationality of each of the permanent of the UN Security Council.
Finally, were he not to be re-elected, this would be a departure from the
tradition that regional allocation of seats on the ICJ bench mirrors the
regional allocation of membership of the Security Council. This because
the re-election of Judge Bhandari and the election of Ambassador Salam
from Lebanon would mean Asia gets one additional seat on the Court and
the WEOG . . . gets one fewer seat.109
The practice thus reveals an apparent paradox. The idea of an arrangement,
informal or not, to give effect to the spirit of Article 9 of the Statute appears to be
intended to promote inclusivity and representativeness in the composition of the
Court and thus in law-making. Yet, the informal agreement itself, by entrenching
the idea that those that come from the North are entitled to greater representation,
merely perpetuates the inequality in law-making that we all know exists.
While the issue of representation (or lack thereof) in the composition of the
Court is the most obvious way in which marginalization takes place in law-making
at the Court, there is another way in which marginalization is illustrated in the
process of law-making at the International Court of Justice. Judges on the Court
have to respond to arguments made by counsel. Thus, counsel before the
International Court of Justice are hugely influential in shaping the jurisprudence of
the Court and thus in law-making. Counsel for States before the International Court
of Justice are overwhelmingly from that same group of States, WEOG, that is
overrepresented in the Court.110 While it is probably known, even if intuitively, that
the overwhelming number of persons appearing before the Court as counsel are
nationals of States from the North, the statistics are quite simply jaw-dropping. By
counsel, I mean individuals’ externally appointed counsel, not in the permanent
employ of the appearing State.
According to a study of persons appearing before the Court between 1999 and
2012, around ninety-seven percent of counsel appearing before the Court are
nationals from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
109. Akande, supra note 106.
110. Shashank P. Kumar & Cecily Rose, A Study of Lawyers Appearing Before the International
Court of Justice 1999-2012, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 893, 917 (2014).
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(OECD)111—another grouping of developed States.112 According to the study,
ninety-seven percent of counsel appearing on behalf of member States of the
OECD were also from OECD, while only three percent of counsel appeared on
behalf of OECD States.113 Interestingly (but unsurprisingly), when non-OECD
States appeared before the Court, they were also overwhelmingly represented by
counsel from OECD States—also ninety-seven percent.114 It should be mentioned
that of non-representation applies equally to the question of gender.115 Kumar and
Rose’s study was limited to cases between 1999 and 2012. Yet most recent cases
reveal a similar trend. Since 2018, twenty-two cases were finalized by the Court.116
Based on the description of counsel as externally appointed experts in international
law, roughly forty-six lawyers appeared as counsel in those matters, and of those,
only one can be said to be from the South. Thus, forty-five out of forty-six lawyers
(ninety-seven percent) came from the global North. 117
B. The International Law Commission
The Statute of the International Law Commission mirrors that of the ICJ with
respect to representation. Article 2 of the ILC Statute provides that members of the
Commission are to be “persons of recognised competence in international law.”
Article 8 of the Statute then provides that “electors shall bear in mind that . . . in
the Commission as a whole representation of the main forms of civilisation and of
the principle legal systems of the world should be assured.” Unlike the Statute of
the ICJ, the ILC Statute goes further, ensuring that this representational requirement
is not left up to an informal agreement. Through an amendment introduced in 1981,
the Statute provides that each UN regional group shall have a maximum number of
seats allocated to it.118 The regional seat allocation for the ILC was established by
the General Assembly, thus making it a formal, compulsory arrangement. Under
this arrangement, Africa would be entitled to eight seats, Asia and the Pacific would
be entitled to seven seats, Eastern Europe would be entitled to three seats, Latin
American and the Caribbean States would be allocated six seats, while WEOG
111. Id. at 903.
112. Of the 38 members of the OECD, only the following four States would fall under what
we have described as the developing world: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico. Id. at 900.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 904.
116. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Qatar v U. A. E.), Judgment, 2021 I.C.J. (Feb. 4); Immunities and Criminal Proceedings
(Eq. Guinea v. Fr.), 2018 I.C.J. Rep. 218; see also Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Eq. Guinea v.
Fr.), Judgment, 2020 I.C.J. (11 Dec.); Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council under
Article 84 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Bahr., Egypt, Saudi Arabia and U. A. E.
v. Qatar), Judgment, 2020 I.C.J. (14 July); Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council
under Article II, Section 2, of the 1944 International Air Services Transit Agreement (Bahr., Egypt and
U. A. E. v. Qatar), Judgment, 2020 I.C.J. (14 July); Jadhav (India v. Pak.), 2019 I.C.J. Rep. 418.
117. In these statistics, I have only included the senior counsel. Including all externally senior
counsel would, however, not change this statistic. In fact, such inclusion would likely make it worse
since many of the other persons not included come from the same law firm.
118. Statute of the Int’l L. Comm’n. art. 9. This amendment was introduced by General
Assembly Resolution 36/39 of 1981.
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would be allocated eight seats. Two additional seats would rotate between Africa,
Eastern Europe, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America, and the Caribbean,
respectively. While certainly more equitable than the informal arrangement for the
ICJ, it is hard to ignore that WEOG is allocated a greater number of seats than the
much larger Asia and Pacific Group of States.
In a very interesting paper, Monica Pinto suggests that the allocation of the
Commission’s membership among regional groups “roughly corresponds to the
distribution of population around the world.”119 This conclusion, though stated
tentatively as “roughly,” is probably overly optimistic. The population of WEOG is
not greater than, or even equal to, that of Asia and the Pacific. But more
importantly, Pinto’s paper raises another important issue. She states that the
equitable regional representation of the membership in the Commission “is not
translated to the level of the appointment of Special Rapporteurs on the
Commission.” 120 Yet it is the Special Rapporteur that drives the work of the
Commission. Of course, the Commission prides itself on the collegial nature of its
working method, suggesting an equality of all members. Yet there is no question
that on any given topic, the Special Rapporteur is more equal than other members.
According to the United Nation’s codification division, the Special Rapporteur
“marks out and develops the topics, explains the state of the law and makes
proposals for draft provisions in the reports on the topic.”121 The reports of the
Special Rapporteur are said to “form the very basis of the work of the Commission”
on any given topic.122 Within the Drafting Committee of the Commission, it is the
Special Rapporteur that presents the drafts to be considered (other members can,
of course, suggest proposals for amendments and even counter-proposals, but it is
the drafts of the Special Rapporteur that serve as the basis for the amendments and
counter-proposals), explains the rationales and the pros and cons of other proposals
and generally tries to steer the Commission towards a successful conclusion. 123
Since its creation, the Commission has appointed sixty-one Special
Rapporteurs.124 Pinto noted that of the sixty-one Special Rapporteurs of the
Commission between 1949 and 2016, thirty-one came from WEOG—another jawdropping statistic of more than fifty percent. Africa accounted for only seven
Special Rapporteurs while only five Special Rapporteurs have come from the Asia
and Pacific Group of States. Pinto also observed that on those topics with a systemic
reach (i.e., not limited to a particular area of law, such as on the law of treaties,
customary international law, and State responsibility), the Special Rapporteurs have

119. See Mónica Pinto, The Authority and Membership of the Commission in the Future, in SEVENTY
YEARS OF THE COMMISSION 370 (U.N. ed., 2021).
120. Id.
121. The Work of the International Law Commission, U.N., U.N. Sales No. E.12.V.2, at 26
(9th ed. 2017).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. For a full list, see Membership: Special Rapporteurs of the International Law Commission (19492016), INT’L L. COMM’N, http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/annex3.shtml (last visited Aug. 27, 2021).
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almost always been “white and male.”125 She concludes, correctly, I think, that it is
questionable whether the ideal in Article 8 of a Commission reflecting the “main
forms of civilization” has been attained.126 More specifically, it may be said that this
skewness in the proportion of representation of Special Rapporteurs perpetuates
the disenfranchisement of people of the South in international law-making.
IV. DOES REPRESENTATION MATTER ANYWAY
It may well be asked whether representation as such really matters. In other
words, does it really matter that this or that group is represented? A different way
of putting this question is whether the decisions of the ICJ or the outputs of the
ILC would have been different—and how—had there been greater representation?
After all, what is important for these bodies in terms of composition is the expertise
of its members, and their qualifications in international law, not their race or their
nationality; not whether they come from the North or South or whether they come
from powerful or not such powerful States. A similar question, albeit in the context
of gender, has been posed by Zuzana Trávníčková.127 In her article, she states that
when her students “look at the picture of the Commission members on the
Commission’s website” they immediately notice the “disproportion between the
number of women and men” and “express disapproval”.128 She states that her
students then ask “whether it is wrong, [or whether] it is a real problem that there
are less women than men.” 129 The answer to that question, according to
Trávníčková is that “knowledge of and attitude towards international law are a
matter of experience and not a matter of gender . . . .”130 In the context of race and
representation, the argument may well be that “knowledge and attitude towards
international law are a matter of experience and not a matter of race, nationality, or
origin.” From this perspective, the composition ought not to matter, because it
would after all not “influence the quality of the Commission’s outcomes” or the
Court’s decisions.131 In my comment on Trávníčková’s paper, I expressed
disagreement with the conclusion that the underrepresentation of gender as such is
“not wrong” and “is not a real problem.” I believe the underrepresentation of
women “is wrong” and is a “real problem.”132 By the same token I believe that the
underrepresentation of people from the South, whether in the Commission or in
the Court, is also wrong and would be a real problem.

125. Pinto, supra note 119, at 371.
126. Id.
127. See Zuzana Trávníčková, The International Law Commission and the International Law Codification
Market, in SEVENTY YEARS OF THE INT’L L. COMM’N. 351 (U.N. ed., 2021).
128. Id. at 357– 58.
129. Id. at 358.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Dire Tladi, Concluding Remarks: The Authority and the Membership of the Commission in the
Future – Art, Science and Economics: A Comment on Trávníčková and Pinto, in SEVENTY YEARS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 375, 379 (“Her answer is interesting—and that I do not agree
with, but more on that in the conclusion.”).

2022] Representation, Inequality, Marginalization, and International Law-Making

83

Quite apart from the value inherent in representation, we ought to not forget
that all of us are products of cultural influence, background, education and, in
general, our experience. Whether we care to admit or not, our legal positions are
also driven by normative and policy considerations, which are significantly shaped
by our backgrounds.133 If anyone doubts the relevance of the background of
individuals, one only need to look at the voting records of members of both the
Court and the Commission on various international law issues, particularly those of
a sensitive nature. When the ILC adopted on first reading, its Draft Conclusions on
Peremptory Norms, it was not a surprise to me that all members of the Commission
that were nationals of Permanent members at the time expressed strong criticism to
draft conclusion 16 and its commentaries because, in their view, decisions of the
UN Security Council are not subject to jus cogens—a view also held by their States.134
By the same token, it is not surprising that members of the ILC from the South
generally supported the Draft Articles on Expulsion of Aliens and would have liked
to see greater restrictions on the right of States to expel non-nationals since it is
mainly non-nationals from the South that often face expulsion from States in the
North.135
133. In the context of the law on self-defense, I have explained my own biases as follows: “It
is worth setting out . . . the approach and normative premises from which this chapter proceeds . . . .
Second, powerful States tend to seek to ‘de-constrain’ themselves from the shackles of law while leaving
the illusion of the constraining power of law. I am thus concerned about—and thus seek to avoid—an
interpretation of law that facilitates the ‘de-constraining’ through an expansive interpretation . . . [that]
benefits the powerful.” Dire Tladi, The Use of Force in Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors, Decline of
Collective Security and the Rise of Unilateralism: Whither International Law?, in 1 SELF DEFENSE AGAINST
NON-STATE ACTORS 14, 21 (Anne Peters & Christian Marxsen eds., 2019).
134. See, e.g., Zagaynov (Russian member), U.N. ILCOR, 70th Sess., 3416th mtg. at 6, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3416 (June 1, 2018) (“According to the draft conclusion, States and courts could
decide whether to comply with a resolution of an international organization, including that of the
Security Council, based on their own assessment of the resolution’s compliance with peremptory
norms. States that wished to avoid their obligation to comply with binding decisions could interpret the
draft conclusion as an invitation to do just that, on the basis of such jus cogens norms . . . . [This] could
have a negative impact on the work of the Security Council to promote international peace and security,
which already faced well-known challenges, and on the overall effectiveness of international
organizations.”); Murphy (U.S. member), id. at 11 (“As indicated by Mr. Zagaynov, the specific
reference to the Security Council of the United Nations was inappropriate.”); see also Huang, U.N.
ILCOR, 70th Sess., 3419th mtg., at 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3419 (July 3, 2018) (“Draft conclusion
[16], in his view, presented serious problems.”); Huang, U.N. ILCOR, 70th Sess., 3421st mtg., at 14,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3421 (July 26, 2018) (“The only criterion for the legality of a binding resolution
adopted by the Security Council was that it must have received more than nine votes from Council
members, including the five permanent members.”); Wood, id. at 6 (“[I]nclusion of a separate reference
to Security Council resolutions seemed unwise and risked undermining the effectiveness of its
resolutions and the collective security system put in place by the Charter of the United Nations, and
could even take the international community back to the era of the League of Nations, when each
member ultimately decided whether or not to comply with the decisions of the Council of the League.”).
135. See, e.g., Wisnumurti, U.N. ILCOR, 66th Sess., 3204th mtg., at 6, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SR.3204 (May 14, 2014) (“In his view, the draft articles reflected the balance between the
sovereign rights of a State and the rights of aliens present in its territory.”); Niehaus, U.N. ILCOR, 66th
Sess., 3202d mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3202 (May 9, 2014) (criticizing the view of States
promoting “the traditional practice through which States had full discretion to expel foreigners from
their territory without any outside interference” describing these views as based on “confusion”); AlMarri, U.N. ILCOR, 64th Sess., 3129th mtg. at ¶¶ 25, 27, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3129 (May 8, 2012)
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The ILC’s work on the Immunity of State Officials, in particular the
controversial Draft Article 7,136 provides an apt illustration of how the place of
origin of members of the Commission affects their positions. All the African
members that participated in the vote, with the exception of Ahmed Laraba from
Algeria, supported Draft Article 7.137 Similarly, all six members of the Latin
American group voted in favor of Draft Article 7.138 For the Asian group, only
Huikang Huang, the Chinese member, and Aniruddha Rajput, the Indian member,
voted against the Draft Article, while the other four members voted in favor. 139
What was also interesting is that members of the Commission that opposed the
draft article were nationals of the more powerful States (i.e., nationals of Security
Council member States140 and generally from Europe and the United States). The
exceptions to this trend (members of the Commission hailing from Europe that did
support the Draft Article) were Concepcíón Escobar Hernández, Patrícia Galvão
Teles, Marja Lehto and August Reinisch. The point here is not that members from
(“[A]ll over the world, aliens who were legitimate residents of countries were increasingly falling under
the scrutiny of Governments that wished to return them to their countries of nationality. That was
particularly true in Europe, which was traditionally host to aliens from Africa and other regions . . . .
The report and draft articles submitted by the Special Rapporteur deserved careful attention and, to the
extent that they sought to ensure that any order of expulsion should be in accordance with the law and
international standards and should guarantee [the rights of the aliens], they should be supported.”);
Tladi, id. at ¶ 37 (“[U]nlike Mr. Murphy, he did not believe that the starting point [of the draft articles]
should be the sovereign right of States to decide who was authorized to reside in their territory and in
what circumstances. . . .”); Saboia, id. at ¶ 51 (“[H]e agreed entirely with Mr. Tladi on the need to strike
a balance between the rights of States and the rights of individuals subject to expulsion . . . .”). These
more positive statements can be compared with the positions of members of the Commission from
States whose nationals are not generally the subject of expulsion. See, e.g., Murphy, id. at ¶ 22 (“First, the
Commission needed to consider whether [instead of draft articles it] should instead be . . . reworking .
. . the current articles into a series of guidelines or best practices. Second, if draft articles were . . .
adopted, [the Commission should] rework them so that they truly reflected the current obligations that
States had accepted, either through treaties to which they had become parties or through their wellestablished practice.”); Wood, U.N. ILCOR, 66th Sess., 3204th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3204
(May 14, 2014) (“[A]ll States had detailed laws and regulations on expulsion; if a rule the Commission
articulated was not actually reflected in national laws, then it should say so, or its reasoning might be
criticized.”). Even Forteau, who generally took on a positive attitude towards the draft articles did make
this point, which would serve to limit the protection offered by the draft articles: “Generally speaking,
what was extremely problematic was that the draft articles made no provision for possible derogations
along the lines of Article 4 of the [ICCPR] and it allowed no exceptions [to rights of aliens].”
136. Article 7 of the Draft Articles on the Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal
Jurisdiction, Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-Ninth Session (A/72/10), provides
for exceptions to the rule on immunity ratione materiae from foreign criminal jurisdiction in respect of
the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, the crime of apartheid, torture, and
enforced disappearance.
137. Voting in favor of the provision from the African group of members were Yacouba Cisse,
Hussein Hassouna, Charles Jalloh, Hassan Ouazzani Chahdi, Chris Maina Peter,
138. These were Carlos Argüello Gomez, Juan Manuel Gomez-Robledo, Juan José Ruda
Santolaria, Gilberto Saboia, Eduardo Valencia Ospina, and Marcelo Vásquez-Bermúdez.
139. Mahmoud Hmoud, Shinya Murase, Hong Thao Nguyen, and Ki Gab Park all voted in
favour.
140. All members of the Commission that are nationals of UN Security Council (Koman
Kolodkin, Sean Murphy, Huikang Huan, and Michael Wood) not only opposed Draft Article 7 but gave
strongly worded statements in explanation of vote. U.N. ILCOR, 69th Sess., 3378th mtg. at 9–11, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3378.
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particular regions or parts of the world will always take particular positions. Rather,
it is that members from particular regions and parts of the world, whether they are
from developing or developed States, whether they are from powerful or vulnerable
States, are more likely to adopt particular postures, so that representation, including
representation as Special Rapporteurs matters. Thus, the underrepresentation of
some in the working of the ILC, including in the appointment of Special
Rapporteurs, does have an influence on the products of the Commission.
A similar observation can be made with respect to the International Court of
Justice. For example, given the policy position of the United States and the United
Kingdom regarding the use of force, is it any surprise that all the judges from those
States have generally adopted different positions to the Court on the rules of
international law relevant to the use of force in self-defense against non-State
actors?141 I do not, by any means, mean to suggest that all lawyers from those State
will of necessity hold those positions, or even that judges nominated by those States
will always hold those positions (I know many prominent US international lawyers
who hold a different position, just like I know African lawyers who hold a different
position). Rather, the more nuanced point I wish to make is that that position is more
likely to be held by an international lawyer from those States than an international
lawyer from the South. Responding to Trávníčková’s claim that gender
representation did not matter, I said the following:
So, while we can never have the answer to the hidden question of
whether a more equitable representation would have affected the outcomes
of the work of the Commission, surely there is value in diversity itself.
Moreover, having experienced two versions of the Commission, I can
attest that the presence of women has had an impact.142
Perhaps, a reader may ponder whether the composition of the Court has
generally affected decisions of the Court—this is a more direct way of asking the
“does it matter question.” Whether particular decisions of the Court would be
different if the Court were composed differently is difficult to say and would be a
matter of speculation.143 Yet it would hard to imagine that composition of a court
or tribunals did not matter.144 The Nuclear Advisory Opinion might provide some

141. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. 14, 259 (June 27) (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel); id. at 528 (dissenting opinion of
Judge Jennings); see generally Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 270 (Nov. 6)
(separate opinion of Judge Buergenthal); see generally id. at 225 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins); Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,
2004 I.C.J. 136, 240 (July 9) (declaration of Judge Buergenthal); id. at 207 (separate opinion of Judge
Higgins).
142. Tladi, supra note 132, at 383.
143. See, e.g., Rosemary Hunter, Introduction: Feminist Judgments as Teaching Resources, 2 OÑATI
SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 47 (2012).
144. See, e.g., JOHN DUGARD, CONFRONTING APARTHEID: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF SOUTH
AFRICA, NAMIBIA AND PALESTINE 291 (2018); Jean Allain, supra note 52, at 35, 43 (who both show
how the change in the composition of the Court resulted in the Court reversing its decision in the South
West Africa Cases (Eth. v S. Afr.; Liber. v S. Afr.), Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6 (July 18)).
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insights about how composition matters. 145 As is now well-known, in that advisory
opinion, the Court controversially held, by seven votes to seven, with the President
casting a deciding vote, that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be
contrary to the . . . rules of humanitarian law” but that “in view of the current state
of the law . . . the Court cannot conclude definitively whether” such use “would be
lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very
survival of a State would be at stake.”146 Less prominently, the Court held that there
is “neither in customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and
universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such.” 147 The
general correlation between the positions of the judges—whether they are from
developed or developing countries, whether they are from nuclear weapon States or
non-nuclear weapon States—is both unsurprising and revealing.
As to the question of whether international law provides a comprehensive and
universal prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons, all but two of the judges from
developing countries voted against the decision of the Court that there was no such
prohibition.148 Moreover, not a single judge from the developed world, or from any
nuclear weapons State, voted against that dispositif. Even more interesting was the
dispositif concerning international humanitarian law. There, in addition to
Shahabuddeen, Koroma, and Weeramanry, Judges Schwebel (United States), Oda
(Japan), Guillaume (France), Oda (Japan) and Higgins (the United Kingdom) all
voted against the dispositif. In other words, three judges from nuclear weapon States
dissented, and all four judges hailing from developed States dissented. Yet the
dissents of these four judges from developed States, including three from nuclear
weapon States, support, rather than detract from, the point that composition
matters. All four of these judges—Schwebel, Oda, Guillaume, and Higgins—
objected to the equivocal language in the second part of that dispositif, suggesting
that the more correct position was not the that “the Court cannot conclude
definitively” that the use of nuclear weapons was unlawful, but rather that as a
matter of law the use of nuclear weapons in those “extreme circumstances” was
lawful. While, for example, Judge Higgins’ dissenting opinion is extremely nuanced,
critiquing mainly the methodology employed by the Court in coming to the
dispositif,149 and while it is equally critical of the possible implications of the dispositif
that the use of nuclear weapons contrary to international humanitarian and jus ad
bellum could be lawful, the essence of the advisory opinion is that, 150 in those
145. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep.
226 (July 8).
146. Id. at ¶ 105, (Dispositif 2E).
147. Id. at ¶ 105 (Dispositif B).
148. Judges Shahabuddeen (Guyana), Weeramantry (Sri-Lanka) and Koroma (Sierra Leone) all
voted against while Judges Bedjaoui (Algeria), Ranjeva (Madagascar) were the only judges from the
South to vote in favour of that dispositif.
149. Legality of the Threat or Use of Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 583, ¶ 9
(separate dissenting opinion by Higgins, J.).
150. Id. at 590 (“Through this formula of non-pronouncement the Court necessarily leaves
open the possibility that a use or nuclear weapons contrary to humanitarian law might nonetheless be
lawful. This goes beyond anything that was claimed by the nuclear weapon States appearing before the
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extreme circumstances of self-defense, the use of nuclear weapons would be
consistent with international humanitarian law and the law on self-defense subject
to the rules of those fields of law.151 The dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel and
the Separate opinion of Judge Guillaume express similar sentiments. 152 At the other
end of the spectrum, the opinions of Judges Shahabuddeen, Koroma, and
Weeramantry are unequivocal that the Court ought to have found that the threat or
use of nuclear weapons is not permitted under international law.153 Indeed, even the
two African judges, particularly Judge Ranjeva, that voted in favor of the dispositif
did so on the understanding that paragraph 2E of the dispositif, in essence, prohibited
the use of nuclear weapons. 154

Court, who fully accepted that any lawful threat or use of nuclear weapons would have to comply with
both the jus ad bellum and jus in bello.”).
151. Id. at 589 (“We may believe that, in the present stage of weapon development, there may
be very limited prospect of a State being able to comply with the requirements of humanitarian law.
But that is different from finding the use of nuclear weapons ‘generally unlawful’”); Id. at 591 (“If a
substantial number of States in the international community believe that the use of nuclear weapons
might in extremis be compatible with their duties under the Charter . . . they presumably also believe
that they would not be violating their duties under humanitarian law”); id. at 593 (“It not clear to me
that either a pronouncement of illegality in all circumstances of the use of nuclear weapons or the
answers formulated by the Court in paragraph 2E best serve to protect mankind . . . .”).
152. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 149, at
291 (separate opinion of Guillaume, J.) (“In other words, [the Court] concluded that in such
circumstances the law provided no guidance for States. But if the law is silent in this case, States remain
free to act as they intend . . . The constant practice of States is along these lines as far as the jus in bello
concerned.”); id. at 292 (“In these circumstances it follows implicitly but necessarily from operative
paragraph 2E of the Court’s Opinion that States can resort to ‘the threat or use of nuclear weapons . .
. in an extreme circumstance of self-defence . . . This has always been the foundation of the policies of
deterrence whose legality is thus recognised.”); see also the dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel, at 323
(“Moreover, far from justifying the Court’s inconclusiveness, contemporary events rather demonstrate
the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons in extraordinary circumstances”).
153. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 149, at
427 (separate opinion of Shahabuddeen, J.) (“It follows that to hold that humanitarian law does not
apply to the use of nuclear weapons in the main circumstances . . . is to uphold the substance of the
thesis that humanitarian law does not apply at all to the use of nuclear weapons. That view has long
been discarded . . . I am not persuaded that that disfavoured view can be brought back through an
exception based on self-defence”); see also id. at 580 (dissenting opinion of Koroma, A.) (“In the light
of the foregoing conclusion, it cannot be maintained, as the Court has done, that there is in neither
customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the
threat or use of nuclear weapons as such.”); see also id. at 433 (Judge Weearamantry’s detailed dissent
which, at the very outset makes plain his view: “My considered opinion is that the use or threat of
nuclear weapons is illegal in any circumstances whatsoever. It violates the fundamental principles of
international, law, and represents the very negation of the humanitarian concern which underline the
structure of humanitarian law.”).
154. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 149 at
294 (separate opinion of Judge Ranjeva, J.) (stating that the reasons he outlines produce “the conclusion
of the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, merely confirm, in my view, the state of positive
law.” He further states that the “absence of a direct and specific reference to nuclear weapons cannot
be used to justify the legality, even indirect, of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.” More definitively,
Judge Ranjenva states that if the “two clauses of paragraph 2E had appeared as separate paragraphs, I
would have voted without hesitation in favour of the first clause and . . . I would have abstained on the
second clause.” The Declaration of Judge Bedjaoui is less clear, but nonetheless point to a preference
for the view that nuclear weapons are or ought to be prohibited.).
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The most recent advisory opinion of the Court, the Chagos advisory opinion,
also provides some interesting insights.155 At first glance, that opinion suggests
sensitivity to the interests of developing States. But could the Court have gone even
further had the Court been composed differently? Since, from the outset, it was so
clear that the right to self-determination had been violated,156 the really contentious
aspect of the proceedings was whether the Court would find that self-determination
was a peremptory norm.157 In response to a question posed by me to then President
of the Court, Judge Yusuf, the President said the Court had not addressed the jus
cogens character of the right, not because it did not believe the right was not jus cogens
but rather because it was not necessary in order to resolve the issue presented. 158
Of course, given that the question concerned not only whether the decolonization
process was completed but also the legal consequences arising from the continued
administration by the United Kingdom of Chagos, the peremptory character of the
right of self-determination was implicated. Finding that the right of selfdetermination would permit the Court to opine not only on the United Kingdom’s
responsibility but also the agreement between the United Kingdom and the United
States concerning the establishment of a military base by the latter in Chagos.159
While many participants in the Chagos proceedings referred to the jus cogens
character of self-determination, the Court did not itself make an explicit declaration
as to the peremptory character of jus cogens. What is interesting is that, while not a
single individual opinion questioned the peremptory character of selfdetermination, several individual opinions did make that pronouncement. It is also
worth pointing out that all the individual opinions making the claim that selfdetermination did have peremptory character were appended by judges from
countries of the South. These include the separate opinion of Judge Cançado

155. Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965,
Advisory Opinion, 2019 I.C.J. 95 (Feb. 25).
156. Only the U.S. judge, Judge Donoghue, came to a different conclusion.
157. See generally Craig Egget & Sarah Thin, Clarification and Conflation: Obligations Erga Omnes in
the Chagos Opinion, EJIL! TALK (May 21, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/clarification-and-conflationobligations-erga-omnes-in-the-chagos-opinion/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2021); see also Julia Sebutinde, Is
the Right to Self-Determination Jus Cogens? Reflections on the Chagos Advisory Opinion, in 75 DEVELOPMENTS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEREMPTORY NORMS OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW (JUS COGENS)
386–413 (Dire Tladi ed., 2021).
158. See Summary Records of the 3478th Meeting, [2019], 71 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N. 71, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3478 (for the exchange between the author and the President of the Court. In
responding to the question, Judge Yusuf said that “the Court had deemed it unnecessary to address the
matter of whether the right to self-determination was a peremptory norm of international law in its
advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965,
because that had not been the point at issue.” In his view, “[t]he General Assembly’s question had been
whether the decolonization process of Mauritius had been lawfully completed.”).
159. See 1966 Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America the Availability for
Defence Purposes of the
British Indian Ocean Territory.

2022] Representation, Inequality, Marginalization, and International Law-Making

89

Trindade (of Brazil),160 Separate Opinion of Judge Robinson (of Jamaica),161 the
joint declaration of Judges Cançado Trindade and Robinson,162 and the Separate
Opinion of Judge Sebutinde.163
The discussion above suggests that composition does matter. This does not
mean that the International Court of Justice will always find, or even often, find
against developing States in favor of developed States.164 The point, however, is that
a system in which the powerful are disproportionately represented in comparison
to the marginalized facilitates the ability of the privileged to disproportionately
contribute to law-making. As a consequence, international law continues to reflect
the interest of the powerful, while paying lip service to politically correct concepts
such as sovereign equality and shared community interests.
CONCLUSION
International law is founded on the notion of sovereign equality of States.
Applied to law-making, this foundational principle would imply that States have
equal opportunity to make, and contribute to the making of, international law. In
customary international law, this basic idea is reflected in the idea that it is general
and widespread practice of States that is at the base of formation of customary
international law. In treaty law, this basic is idea is reflected in such notions as the
pacta tertiis nec nocent rule. Yet international law is not made only by States. Two of
the most important entities that contribute to international law-making are the
International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission. Given the
important role that these two bodies play in international law-making, this Article
considered the extent to which these bodies are appropriately representative in the
pursuit of equal contribution to law-making. The discussion showed that the
representation of both bodies was skewed in favor of powerful, developed States.
An obvious conclusion from the discussion above is that the disproportionate
representation of persons from developed, powerful States has the effect of
marginalizing States of the South and undermines the notion of sovereign equality
of States. But there are questions beyond this obvious conclusion. While there are
many sources of disproportionate influence on international law over which the
marginalized States have little or no influence, such as resource constraints and
education, the marginalized States themselves are active participants in the
marginalization flowing from (under)representation. For example, the composition
of both the International Law Commission and the International Court of Justice is
determined by the General Assembly, a body in which marginalized States hold an
overwhelming majority. By the same token, it is States, including developing States,
160. See Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago, Advisory Opinion
supra note 155, ¶¶ 120 (separate opinion by Cançado, J.) .
161. Id. at ¶ 48 (separate opinion by Robinson, J.).
162. Id. at ¶ 8 (joint declaration of Cançado, J. Trindade, J. and Robinson, J.).
163. Id. at ¶ 26 (separate opinion of Sebutinde, J.).
164. A cursory review of the jurisprudence of the Court reveals that no such pattern is
discernible. For example, the Military and Paramilitary Activities case, supra note 60, and the Arrest Warrant
case, supra note 56, were both decided in favor of developing States.
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that continue to appoint counsel from developed States. If States are serious about
leveling the playing fields in international law-making, then addressing issues of
representation would be the first step. Representation would not, by any stretch of
the imagination, bring marginalized States to a place of equal participation and equal
opportunity to contribute to international law. It would only be baby steps we take
on our path to addressing inequality and marginalization in international law.

